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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the context of this conference on “California in the Spotlight: 
Successes and Challenges in Climate Change Law,” we turn to carbon 
regulation in the Star Wars galaxy.1  In The Empire Strikes Back, Han 
Solo was frozen in carbonite by Boba Fett and transported to Jabba the 
Hutt,2 which gravely affected Han’s constitution.3 Princess Leia and Luke 
Skywalker eventually rescued him in Return of the Jedi.4  Relevant to the 
California carbon analysis herein, Carbonite also is a brand name for 
impenetrable, encrypted high security.5  Without delving into who is 
assuming the role of Jabba the Hutt or which side is the “Empire” in 
 
 1.  This series of galactic battles is particularly relevant to the conference’s spotlight on 
California’s regulation of carbon—perhaps even more so now since California’s George 
Lucas in 2013 sold the rights to the Star Wars franchise, including the patented molecule 
carbonite, to the Walt Disney company for $4 billion.  See Devin Leonard, How Disney 
Bought Lucasfilm—and Its Plans for ‘Star Wars,’ BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Mar. 09, 
2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-07/how-disney-bought-lucasfilm-
and-its-plans-for-star-wars. 
 2.  In the Star Wars movies, carbon-freezing was the process of freezing stored 
tibanna gas in carbonite to preserve it while it was being transported over long distances. 
“To freeze a being solid, then hang him on a wall like some trophy?” Han Solo, Star Wars. 
See Carbon-freezing Definition, WOOKIEEPEDIA THE STAR WARS WIKI, http://starwars. 
wikia.com/wiki/Carbon-freezing (last visited Feb 04, 2014). “Oh, they’ve encased him in 
carbonite. He should be quite well protected. If he survived the freezing process, that is.” 
C-3PO, Star Wars. Id. 
 3.  Id.  “Just relax for a moment. You’re free of the carbonite. Shh. You have 
hibernation sickness.” “I can’t see.” — Leia Organa and Han Solo. Hibernation Sickness 
Definition, WOOKIEPEDIA THE STAR WARS WIKI, http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Hibernation 
_sickness (last visited Feb. 04, 2014). 
 4.  See Han Solo Definition, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Han_Solo 
(last visited Feb. 04, 2014). 
 5.  Carbonite has also been taken as the name of a company which provides highly- 
secure data centers, guarded around the clock.  See CARBONITE, www.carbonite.com (last 
visited Feb. 04, 2014). 
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California’s ongoing carbon battles, the California carbon control program 
has been in carbonite legal limbo concocted under: 
 The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
 The dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
and 
 State administrative law (including state environmental 
requirements). 
California has prevailed in less than half of these legal attacks in this 
trilogy; the program has been delayed by a year6 in legal carbonite and 
inhibited in other regards.  More specifically, California has been 
challenged pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
regarding regulation of its electric power generation facilities and liquid 
fuels in six significant suits.  California settled in favor of challengers or 
lost at the trial stage in five of these six, while the sixth matter was 
dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the claim, 
leaving the plaintiffs to re-file the complaint.7  In addition, California was 
challenged as to whether its regulatory actions regarding sustainable 
energy fuels violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  
It lost this case at the trial level, but the decision recently was reversed 2-
1 on appeal with a dissent supporting the trial court,8 and currently is 
pending an appeal.  California sustainable energy policy has recently 
undergone seven significant legal challenges under California  state law; 
California already either settled in favor of challengers or lost three of the 
five of these challenges, while one was sidetracked on procedural grounds 
without reaching the merits of the claim.9 
In terms of Constitutional requirements, there were numerous articles 
signaling  California about implementing its carbon program carefully to 
avoid certain trip wires.10  California was the last, by a span of four years, of 
 
 6.  See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 
1491 (2012). 
 7.  See infra Section II. 
 8.  See infra Section III. 
 9.  See infra Section IV. 
 10.  Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the 
Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835 (2008); Steven Ferrey, Chad 
Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control 
Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 125 (2010); 
Brian Potts, Regulating Greenhouse Gas ‘Leakage’: How California Can Evade the 
Impending Constitutional Attacks, 25 ELECTRICITY J. 7, 43 (2006) (“. . .because of these 
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11 states in the U.S. to regulate carbon emissions.11  California’s carbon 
regulation is very broad and affects more sectors of the economy, because the 
scope of green house gas (GHG) emissions regulated by California 
includes more gases than other states.12  California regulates GHG emission 
from all aspects of its economy, not just power generators as done in many 
other states.13  California is the twelfth largest GHG producing political 
region in the world,14 making it larger in its carbon emissions than each 
of two-thirds of the Annex I developed nations regulated under the Kyoto 
Protocol.15 
This Article thaws several legal layers of California carbonite, tranche- by-
tranche, and examines the legal fabric.  First, in Section II we examine federal 
Constitutional challenges to California’s A.B. 32 and sustainable energy 
statutes under the Supremacy Clause.  Section III analyzes litigation against 
California carbon control pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution.  Section IV analyzes challenges to the California regulation 
pursuant to state law violations, distinguishing those which proceed from 
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and those which utilize 
other state administrative laws to challenge California’s carbon choices 
and implementation.  Section V examines the trilogy of litigation set forth in 
Sections II –IV as to next steps and implications for state policy. 
II.  A  “BRIGHT LINE” 
In contrast to state law claims,16 Constitutional challenges raise issues 
of the basic power—or lack thereof—of California to take certain regulatory 
actions regarding energy or sustainable energy.  Transgressions of basic 
perimeters of state Constitutional jurisdiction and authority cannot be 
remedied by changes in state law or a quick re-initiation under state 
 
two Constitutional issues, courts are likely to strike down many or all of their proposals”); 
Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent and Cameron Ferrey, FIT in the U.S.A., PUBLIC UTILITIES 
FORTNIGHTLY, June 2010; Steven Ferrey, Shaping American Power: Federal Preemption 
and Technological Change, 11 U. VA. ENVTL. L.J.  47 (1991); Steven Ferrey, Follow the 
Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. 
Future , VA. J.L. & TECH. 89 (2012). 
 11.  Goblets of Fire, supra note 11, at 844–45 (noting ten states participating in the 
RGGI program prior to California’s program). 
 12.  See CAL. CODE OF REGS, tit. 17, § 95,802 (2012). 
 13.  Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act, CA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm. 
 14.  ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,  CAL. ENERGY COMM’N & CAL. PUB. UTIL’S., PROPOSED 
FINAL OPINION SUMMARY ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY STRATEGIES 2 (2008). 
 15.  See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL 
GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY DATA FOR THE PERIOD 1990-2011 14 (2013), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/sbi/eng/19.pdf. 
 16.  See infra Section IV. 
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administrative process.  State regulatory actions regarding energy that 
cross Constitutional limits render the law invalid. 
A.  Recent California Energy Regulation 
After enacting a feed-in-tariff requiring California state utilities to make 
wholesale power purchases from cogeneration facilities at well in excess 
of wholesale rates for power and in excess of federally defined “avoided 
costs,”17 there was a challenge at the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) as to whether this violated the Federal Power Act 
and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
1.  The Federal Power Act Distinctions 
The Federal Power Act sections 205 and 20618 empower FERC 
exclusively to regulate rates for the interstate and wholesale sale and 
transmission of electricity.19  The Federal Power Act directs FERC to 
regulate all interstate electricity transmission and to ensure the reliability 
of the national electricity grid.20  The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
Congress meant to draw a “bright line,” easily ascertained and not requiring 
case-by-case analysis, demarcating exclusive state and federal jurisdiction.21  
When a transaction is subject to exclusive federal FERC jurisdiction and 
regulation, state regulation is preempted by the U.S. Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause, according to a long-standing and consistent line of 
 
 17.  18 C.F.R § 292.304 (2013). 
 18.  16 U.S.C. §§ 824(d)-824(e) (2006). 
 19.  Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Public Utility District 
No. 1, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008). 
 20.  16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 824(a), 824(a-2) (2006). 
 21.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964). 
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rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court:22 “FERC has exclusive authority to set 
and determine the reasonableness of wholesale rates.”23 
The Federal Power Act defines “sale at wholesale” as any sale to any 
person for resale.24  States, however, retain authority over retail electric 
sales because “FERC’s jurisdiction over the sale of power has been 
specifically confined to the wholesale market.”25  If states impose a power 
sale rate in excess of “avoided cost” by either “law or policy,” the “contracts 
will be considered to be void ab initio.”26  The rates, terms, and provisions of 
any wholesale sale, or transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, are 
exclusively within federal jurisdiction and control, not state authority, 
pursuant to the Federal Power Act,27 it does not make any difference 
whether a state acts through its legislature or its energy regulatory agency.28 
The Supreme Court in 1986,29 1988,30 2003,31 and 2008,32 reaffirmed 
and enforced the Filed Rate Doctrine as applied through the Supremacy 
Clause, when states attempted to assert jurisdiction in areas subject 
to FERC’s exclusive authority.  In the most recent of these cases, the 
Supreme Court in 2008 reiterated that the Federal Power Act creates a 
 
 22.  New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).  The 
Supreme Court overturned an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission 
that restrained within the state, for the financial advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost 
hydroelectric energy produced within the state.  It held this to be an impermissible 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 8, 
clause 3 and the Federal Power Act: “Our cases consistently have held that the commerce clause 
of the Constitution precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred 
right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders 
or to the products derived therefrom.”  Id. at 338.  Mont.-Dakota Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. 
Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951), Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 
(1986); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); Entergy La., 
Inc., v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47-50 (2003). 
 23.  Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 371 (1988)( “FERC has exclusive 
authority to determine the reasonableness of wholesale rates.”); accord Pub. Util. Dist. No. 
1, Washington v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (2006) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008). 
 24.  16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2006). 
 25.  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 19  (2002) (italics omitted). 
 26.  Connecticut Light & Power Co., 70 FERC ¶¶  61,012, 61,029–61,030 (1995). 
 27.  New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340 (1982). 
 28.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. et al. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm’n et 
al., 461 U.S. 190, 204, 215 (1983). 
 29.  Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 963 (1986). 
 30.  Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988). 
 31.  Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 51 (2003). 
 32.  See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 
531–32 (2008). 
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“‘bright line’ between state and federal jurisdiction with wholesale power 
sales . . . falling on the federal side of the line.”33 
2.  The 2010 California Power Purchase Tariff 
California mandated that its utilities, and ultimately their captive 
ratepayers, pay above-market rates to certain generators using on-site 
distributed combined heat and power production facilities for their electric 
generation sold in a wholesale transaction to the utilities.  California 
argued that its environmental purpose for regulation should make it exempt 
from preemption in setting above-market wholesale feed-in renewable 
tariff rates for cogeneration facilities of less than 20 Mw and that 
environmental costs could be considered to inflate avoided costs.34  The 
affected utilities and others countered that federal law does not allow state 
regulation of wholesale sales to achieve state environmental goals, that 
federal preemption cannot be avoided based on an environmental purpose 
of the preempted state regulation, and states may not under the guise of 
environmental regulation adopt an economic regulation that requires 
purchase of electricity at a wholesale price outside the framework of the 
Federal Power Act, or if acting under PURPA, at a price that exceeds 
“avoided cost.”35 
FERC36 summarily rejected all of California’s arguments regarding 
generic environmental rationales for Constitutional violations of wholesale 
rates in excess of limits under federal law or as established by FERC.37  
After losing before FERC, California moved for FERC rehearing, or in 
the alternative a clarification of this FERC order.38  While FERC dismissed a 
rehearing of whether California had authority over preempted wholesale 
power sale rates,39 FERC did issue a clarification that in no way altered 
 
 33.  Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (2006), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, 554 U.S. at 531 (citing the separate 
Supreme Court opinions in Nantahala, Southern California Edison, and Mississippi 
Power). 
 34.  Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047, ¶¶ 6–7 (2010). 
 35.  Id. ¶ 52. 
 36.  Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047 (2010). 
 37.  Id. ¶ 64. 
 38.  S. Cal. Edison Co., 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,059, ¶ 2 (2010), (Granting Clarification 
and Dismissing Rehearing). 
 39.  Id. ¶¶ 15, 19. 
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its original legal finding.  FERC reaffirmed that FERC has “exclusive 
jurisdiction.”40 
FERC reiterated that only the federal government can regulate commerce 
between the states and California cannot attempt to regulate commerce 
outside its borders.41  There is precedent regarding California decisions 
fifteen years earlier finding preemption as constitutionally not allowed for 
certain California clean energy regulation altering wholesale renewable 
prices.42  Under the Filed-Rate Doctrine, any dispute about these matters 
may not be arbitrated by the state, but is reserved exclusively to federal 
authority.43 
The federal Court of Appeals agreed with the above decision when it 
previously decided a different recent California case.44  While this decision 
proceeded on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court45 and thereafter was 
remanded to FERC for more clarification,46 this element was not overturned 
when before the Supreme Court.  The court ruled that Congress did not 
intend that the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction over the interstate sale of 
electricity at wholesale be determined by a case-by-case analysis of the 
impact of state regulation on national interests.47 
B.  Other California Challenges 
1.  Federal Preemption of California Authority 
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a city in California was 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause by the Federal Aviation 
Administration Act of 1994 from imposing additional regulation on 
diesel truck emissions for those trucks that accessed the port.48  While 
addressing state/local environmental regulation, the Supreme Court held, 
in striking the California law, that federal law is preemptive of state and 
local law.  This makes for an interesting comparison to the almost 
 
 40.  Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, supra note 37, ¶ 72 n.99 (citing FPC v. Southern California 
Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964)). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 853 
(9th Cir. 1994); S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, at 61,677 (1995). 
 43.  Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988). 
 44.  Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 45.  Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 (2008). 
 46.  Both the P.U.D. No. 1 and Morgan Stanley orders remanded the cases to FERC. 
See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., 554 U.S. at 555 (2008). 
 47.  See also Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964). 
 48.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2105 (2013). 
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simultaneous decision of the Ninth Circuit, in another legal challenge to 
A.B. 32.49 
2.  Truck and Bus Regulation Litigation 
The California Dump Truck Owners Association (“CDTOA”) filed suit 
in federal court in 2011 to challenge CARB’s Truck and Bus Regulation, 
which provides for stricter emissions standards for dump trucks and other 
diesel-fuel vehicles.50  The suit alleged that the regulation is 
unconstitutional because it is preempted by the Federal Aviation 
Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”).  In December 2012, a 
district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 
dismissed the case on procedural grounds rather than reaching the merits 
of the claims.51 
The district court determined that the EPA was a necessary and 
indispensable party to the litigation due to the EPA’s interests in the State 
Implementation Plan of California, which requires federal approval, and 
at which point it becomes a matter not only of state law, but also of federal 
law.52  Because the federal district court could not grant any practical 
relief without joining the EPA, but claims challenging the EPA’s final 
decisions must be brought in the federal court of appeals, the district court 
concluded that the action could not proceed without necessary parties and 
should be dismissed.53 
The CDTOA said it will file a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit 
challenging EPA’s approval of the California State Implementation Plan 
(SIP) under the theory that the SIP impermissibly conflicts with other 
 
 49.  See infra Section IV. 
 50.  Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Nichols, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1131 (E.D. 
Cal. 2012) (The regulation requires particulate matter retrofits beginning in 2012, and will 
require replacement of older vehicles beginning in 2015.  Plaintiffs complained that the 
$150,000 needed for a new CARB-compliant truck and the dramatically decreased value 
of old trucks unfairly burdened small business owners, influenced who could enter the 
industry, and thus conflicted with express terms of the FAAA.)  Id. at 1134. 
 51.  Id. at 1136, 1137 (According to the court, a decision favoring CDTOA would 
undermine the validity of EPA’s approval of California’s State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) 
under the Clean Air Act because the Truck and Bus Regulation is part of California’s SIP. 
Since exclusive jurisdiction of final Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) decisions, 
such as SIP approval, lies with the court of appeals, the District Court concluded it lacked 
jurisdiction). 
 52.  Id. at 1149–50. 
 53.  Id. at 1150. 
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federal laws, specifically, the FAAAA and the Constitution’s Commerce 
Clause.  While its language may preempt state regulation in the form of 
controls on who can enter the trucking industry within a state, it does not 
appear to limit a state’s ability to regulate emission standards.54  CDTOA was 
also seeking an injunction to prevent CARB’s ability to enforce the 
regulation, as the newly imposed regulations would impair and already 
struggling regional industry and economy and have further alleged 
devastating effects.55  This was because the regulations essentially require 
all diesel-powered vehicles utilized in the industry to be replaced with 
new CARB-compliant vehicles.56 
In the four California matters mentioned in the sections above, dealing 
with the borders of federal and state authority over energy and environmental 
matters, federal authority preempted state authority in all but one of these 
cases,57 and the other was procedurally dismissed, without reaching the 
merits, because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Two of the four 
decisions above were rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court.58  Article VI, the 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, and the Federal Power Act,59 establish 
a judicially defined “bright line” prohibition of state regulation of 
wholesale transactions in power.60  State regulation proceeding beyond this 
jurisdictional border, if challenged, is suspended in carbonite. 
III.  STATE REGULATORY DISCRIMINATION AFFECTING COMMERCE 
A.  The Precedent 
1.  Historic Precedent 
Even where a particular energy regulation is within state authority, it 
still must be applied within the constraints of the dormant Commerce 
 
 54.  Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
305, § 601, 108 Stat. 1569, 1605, 1606 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C.). 
 55.  Tina Grady Barbacchia, CA Dump Truck Owners Association Sues CARB, 
BETTER ROADS (last visited July 28, 2013) available at http://www.betterroads.com/ca-
dump-truck-owners-association-sues-carb/. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., 554 U.S. at 527; Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 
36 F.3d at 853; S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (1995); Re Cal. Public Utils. 
Comm’n et al., 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,059 (2010); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct. at 2096; 
Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. 
 58.  Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., 554 U.S. at 527; Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2096. 
 59.  16 U.S.C. § 791a-825r (1920). 
 60.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“the laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”). 
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Clause, so as not to unduly burden interstate commerce within the United 
States, pursuant to Article I of the Constitution.61  The dormant Commerce 
Clause prohibits actions that are facially discriminatory or unduly 
burdensome against interstate commerce.62  The Supreme Court held that 
statutes which establish regional barriers (not necessarily just one-state 
isolation) and discriminate only against some states, rather than all states, 
violate the Commerce Clause.63  Facially geographically discriminatory 
statutes are reviewed subject to judicial “strict scrutiny,” and for such a 
statute or regulation to be valid, the state must establish that the statute 
serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means 
affecting commerce to achieve that interest.64 
The Supreme Court held that a government agency cannot discriminate 
against interstate commerce “if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, 
adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.”65  For such a 
statute or regulation to be upheld, the state usually must establish that there 
is a compelling state interest for which the statute is the least intrusive means 
to achieve that interest:66  However, “even if environmental preservation 
were the central purpose of the pricing order, that would not be sufficient 
to uphold a discriminatory regulation.”67 
State statutes or regulation found to discriminate against out-of-state 
interests based on geography or favoring local interests, are found to be 
 
 61.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 62.  See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting Oregon 
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994)). 
 63.  See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). 
 64.  There was an argument advanced that courts would not apply strict scrutiny to 
an RPS that bases eligibility on a generator’s ability to produce benefits for a state rather 
than the geographic origin of the electricity.  NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, THE 
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A PRACTICAL GUIDE app. A, at 4 (2001).  However, 
the Supreme Court does not always accept the stated state purpose disavowing facial 
discrimination and strict scrutiny.  See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 
88, 105 (1992) (“In assessing the impact of a state law on the federal scheme, we have 
refused to rely solely on the legislature’s professed purpose and have looked as well to the 
effects of the law.”); Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
 65.  Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
 66.  Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 33, 59 (2009) (outlining a history of the dormant Commerce 
Clause). 
 67.  West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1994). 
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per se invalid.68  State and local laws are deemed unconstitutional under 
the dormant Commerce Clause when a law differentiates between in-state 
and out-of-state economic interests in a manner that benefits the former 
and burdens the latter.69  If the statute is geographically even-handed 
facially and in effect, the courts apply the Pike balancing test to determine 
whether the state’s interest justifies the incidental discriminatory effect of 
the regulatory mechanism, as applied.70  Even when there is no obvious or 
overt facial discrimination against out-of-state or other geographically- based 
interests, where the effect or purpose is to discriminate, the ultimate impact 
is enough to make the regulation unconstitutional.71 
Laws that attempt to regulate the conduct of out-of-state businesses also 
violate the Commerce Clause.72  These laws can assume the form of added 
taxes and charges on out-of-state goods.73  States are prohibited from 
attaching restrictions to any goods that they import from other states:  
“States and localities may not attach restrictions to . . . imports in order to 
control commerce in other States.”74 
Where a state statute provided a tax exemption for sales of two types of 
wine, both produced from products produced in the state, even though not 
needing to mention the state by name, the effect was practically state-
specific discrimination, and it was found to be discriminatory, and a 
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.75  A state cannot regulate to 
favor or require use of, its own in-state energy resources even for a small 
percentage of total use,76 nor can it, by regulation, harbor energy-related 
resources originating in the state.77  States cannot require use of in-state 
fuels even for the purpose of satisfying federal Clean Air Act 
 
 68.  See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (noting that 
if a statute is facially discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid); Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997). 
 69.  See Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99. 
 70.  See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (explaining the 
balancing test for when a statute “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental”). 
 71.  C. & A. Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Hunt v. 
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). 
 72.  See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326–27, 343 (1989) (striking 
requirement that the price of beer was not higher than that charged out-of-state). 
 73.  See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1992) 
(invalidating an Alabama law imposing an extra fee on imported hazardous waste). 
 74.  Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994). 
 75.  Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1984); see also Carbone, 511 
U.S. at 393. 
 76.  Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–55 (1992).  The Oklahoma statute 
overturned involved only a 10% allocation of the market to in-state producers.  See also 
Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 77.  New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982). 
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requirements.78  Income tax credits cannot be given by a state only to in-
state producers of fuel additives.79 
2.  Recent Precedent 
The Supreme Court consistently has required that the regulation of 
power by the states must not discriminate regarding the origin of power 
or the ultimate impact, which may discourage its flow in interstate 
commerce.80  Recent federal court opinions construing state electric 
regulation have scrupulously followed this doctrine.81 
Most recently, Justice Richard Posner, for the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in a unanimous decision, affirmed the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s approval of the Midwest Independent Service Operator’s 
(MISO)82 proportionate customer utility allocation of transmission costs 
for high-voltage transmission lines to move renewable wind power to 
populated areas.83  For authority that supports its holding on the respective 
jurisdiction of state and federal government to regulate electricity, the 
opinion relied on a 2012 law review article authored by Professor Ferrey.84  
The decision declared unconstitutional a state that limited state renewable 
portfolio standards to in-state generation, as a violation of the Commerce 
Clause: it “trips over an insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan 
cannot, without violating the commerce clause of Article I of the 
Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.”85 
 
 78.  Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596–97 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 79.  New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 278–80 (1988). 
 80.  New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 335, 344 (1982) 
(overturning as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause an order of the state Public 
Utilities Commission that restrained within the state for the financial advantage of in-state 
ratepayers, renewable power produced within the state). 
 81.  See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F. Supp. 2d 183, 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
 82.  MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and 
parts of Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana. 
 83.  Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 773, 781 (7th Cir. June 7, 
2013) MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects among all of the utilities who 
draw power from the MISO grid in proportion to each utilities’ overall volume of usage; 
FERC approved MISO’s rate design, which led some states to initiate court appeal. 
 84.  Id. at 776 (citing to article by Professor Steven Ferrey). 
 85.  Id. Michigan actually initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination in 
its RPS program as a demonstration that out-of-state powered transmitted to it was not 
recognized as of the same value as in-state electricity, therefore Michigan should not pay 
a share of power line tariffs transmitting power from out of state that did not have equal 
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Justice Scalia, concurring in the majority prior opinion in West Lynn 
Creamery, submitted that, “subsidies for in-state industry . . . would clearly 
be invalid under any formulation of the Court’s guiding principle” for 
“dormant” Commerce Clause cases.86 
B.  California Challenge 
1.  The Trial Court Finding Unconstitutional Regulation 
The California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (“LCFS”) rule is to reduce 
the carbon content of transportation fuels sold in California by 10% by the 
year 2020 from the year 2010 baseline.87  The LCFS is a “set of 
regulations to govern the marketing of gasoline-ethanol blends sold in 
California.”88  CARB’s LCFS rule includes the lifecycle GHG emissions 
of fuel, including emissions produced during production and transportation 
of fuels to California.  Corn-derived ethanol produced in the Midwest is 
assigned a higher carbon intensity score than chemically similar corn-
derived ethanol produced anywhere in California, regardless of its 
transportation within California.89 
The LCFS rule was challenged in two court cases alleging that it violated 
federal and state law.  One was under California state law claims,90 and 
another under federal Constitutional law in Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Goldstene.  Plaintiffs alleged that CARB discriminated against 
interstate commerce and fuels produced out of state. 
The Rocky Mountain litigation on the LCFS program aspects of AB 32 
in federal court caused standing issues for several of the plaintiffs.91  The 
court held that individual plaintiffs have not provided evidence of 
individual standing, but that at least one of the industry plaintiffs’ members 
suffered an actual injury, which establishes association standing.92  To 
 
recognition and benefit.  Instead of supporting its position, this assertion caused Judge 
Posner to respond to this assertion, even though it was not the tariff issue before the 
Court.  Id. 
 86.  512 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 87.  California Air Resources Board, Final Regulation Order. 
 88.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1099 (E.D. 
Cal. 2011); 719 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (E.D. Cal. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 13-
1148 (Mar. 20, 2014). 
 89.  Id. at 1177–78. 
 90.  See infra Section IV. 
 91.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1099 (E.D. 
Cal. 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 13-1148 (Mar. 20, 2014). 
 92.  Id. at 1099–1100.  The Court points to two specific affidavits that name specific 
plants that will be harmed by the LCFS and alleges injuries that have been suffered and 
therefore the Court finds the first prong satisfied.  Id.  Growth Energy has previously 
submitted evidence that satisfy this prong. 
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establish associational standing, the industry plaintiffs have to satisfy 
three prongs:  Its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right, the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s 
purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires 
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.93 
Of note, state regulation of biofuels was before the Supreme Court 25 
years before.  In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, the Supreme Court 
struck as unconstitutional a state law that gave favorable tax treatment to 
ethanol produced in-state, and held that health impacts were only incidental 
benefits, while the Commerce Clause violation was not permitted.94 
In December 2011, the Eastern District of California upheld plaintiffs’ 
argument, invalidating certain parts of the LCFS rule and enjoining the 
rule’s enforcement, as it “discriminates against out-of-state corn-derived 
ethanol while favoring in-state corn ethanol and impermissibly regulates 
extraterritorial conduct.”95  “Regulating out-of-state conduct” is not the 
only test applied under the dormant Commerce Clause; the broader 
definition of discrimination “simply means differential treatment of in-
state and out of state economic interests that benefits the former and 
burdens the latter.”96  However, defendants had not met their burden to 
 
 93.  Id. at 1099. 
 94.  New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 279 (1988). 
 95.  843 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.  CARB attributed the difference in carbon intensity 
values to multiple scientific factors in addition to geographic location factors (emissions 
related to shipping or transportation of fuel).  The court relied upon a “table” of Carbon 
Intensity values generated by CARB. 
 96.  Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 
511 U.S. 93, 99.  Under the Pike test, courts will uphold a non-facially discriminatory 
statute “unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”  397 U.S. at 142. 
“A facially-neutral statute that imposes an incidental ‘burden on interstate commerce 
incommensurate with the local benefits secured,’ Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 108, 
would fail the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  A statute or regulation would discriminate against commerce 
itself when the statute 
(i) shifts the costs of regulation onto other states, permitting in 
 state lawmakers to avoid the costs of their political decisions, 
(ii)  has the practical effect of requiring out-of-state commerce to be 
 conducted at the regulating state’s direction, or 
(iii) alters the interstate flow of the goods in question, as distinct from the 
impact on companies trading in those goods.” 
Entergy v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013), quoting Am. Booksellers Found. v. 
Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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show that there is not a nondiscriminatory means to adequately serve their 
objective.97  The court found that CARB had several other means to address 
the state’s purpose without discriminating against out-of-state fuel 
products.98  The court here incorporates the Dean Milk requirement to 
choose the least discriminatory or intrusive on interstate commerce 
mechanism to regulate, when it balances local purpose against a statute 
which either discriminates on its face or impermissibly controls conduct 
outside its borders.99 
The court held that the LCFS “may not impose a barrier to interstate 
commerce based on the distance that the product must travel in interstate 
commerce.”100  Even though the LCFS does benefit some other out-of-
state producers or burdens some in-state producers, the court finds that 
this does not absolve the LCFS from a finding that it discriminates on its 
face:101  “[L]egislation favoring in-state economic interests is facially 
invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, even when such legislation 
also burdens some in-state interests or includes some out-of-state interests in 
the favored classification.  Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., 582 F.Supp.2d 1231, 
1243 (C.D.Cal.2007).”102 
2.  Indirect Regulation Beyond State Borders 
The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs alternatively asserted that strict scrutiny 
applies for an additional reason because under the Commerce Clause, one 
state’s laws cannot “control conduct beyond the boundary of the 
state.”103  Defendants countered that the only effects the LCFS may have on 
out-of-state producers are indirect and therefore not directly regulating 
outside California’s boundaries.104 The Court found for plaintiffs, identifying 
the issue as “whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control 
 
 97.  Supra note 92, at 1093.  The Court did recognize that lifecycle analysis is a 
widely accepted national and international approach to reduce carbon emissions, but this 
does not mean there is not a nondiscriminatory means to achieve this goal on a local level.  
Id.  The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs offered several nondiscriminatory alternatives 
including a tax on fossil fuels or solely regulating tailpipe emissions.  Id. at 1093–94. 
 98.  See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
 99.  See supra note 92, at 1093. 
 100.  Id. at 1089. 
 101.  Id. at 1089.  For example, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol has a lower intensity 
score than some Californian corn ethanol and in-state producers of corn ethanol are 
penalized when importing corn from out-of-state. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1089 (quoting Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (C.D. 
Cal.2007)). 
 103.  Id. at 1090.  The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs cite such examples as the LCFS 
regulating land use in the Midwest and deforestation in South America rather than solely 
regulating ethanol carbon emissions within the borders of California. Id. at 1090–91. 
 104.  Id. at 1091. 
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conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”105  “While a State may seek 
lower prices for its consumers, it may not insist that producers or consumers 
in other States surrender whatever competitive advantages they may 
possess.”106  There are other regulatory mechanisms to do this that raise 
zero Constitutional concerns, although California did not elect these for 
this program.107 
The trial court points out that states cannot place restrictions on imports “in 
order to control commerce in other states.”108  The court held that “this type 
of regulation ‘forc[es] a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State 
before undertaking a transaction in another,’ causing the LCFS to ‘directly 
regulate[ ] interstate commerce.’”109 
3.  The Pending Preemption Challenge 
Plaintiffs alternatively argued that CARB’s LCFS regulations were 
preempted by federal environmental law,110 when LCFS closed off 
California to those federally grandfathered bio-refineries which would 
need either to not participate in the California ethanol fuel market or 
 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 
(1986); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (holding that 
one state “has no power to project its legislation into [another state] by regulating the price 
to be paid in that state for [products] acquired there”). 
 107.  See Steven Ferrey,  Solving the Multi-Million Dollar Constitutional Dilemma, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 108.  Supra note 92, at 1092. The LCFS requires all commercial providers, whether 
within the state or outside, to detail the entire geographic pathway of the fuel during its 
lifetime so that CARB may assign it a carbon intensity score.  Id.; see also Carbone, 511 
U.S. at 383. 
 109.  Supra note 92, at 1092. 
 110.  Id. at 1101. The petitioners asserted that the 2007 amendment to the Clean Air 
Act, the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), precluded CARB from its state-
level LCFS program.  California retorted that regulating emissions is within traditional 
state police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens, and “[a]ir pollution 
prevention falls under the broad police powers of the statesFalseEnvironmental regulation 
traditionally has been a matter of state authority.”  Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n v. Davis, 331 
F.3d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 2003).  There is a “savings clause” for states in the Clean Air Act 
(“nothing in this act shall preclude or deny the right of any state or political subdivision 
thereof to adopt or enforce [any pollution standard]. . .except that such State . . . may not 
adopt or enforce any standard which is less stringent than the [federal] standard. . .” 42 
U.S.C. § 7146). 
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reduce their carbon emissions, although not so required by federal law.111 
Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs’ preemption motion not on their  
merits, but on procedural defenses based on lack of standing and lack of 
causation.112 
The court held that while individual plaintiffs had not provided evidence 
of individual standing, but that at least one of the industry plaintiff 
members suffered an actual injury which establishes associational  
standing.113  Because the state opposed an as-applied preemption challenge 
while the plaintiffs opposed a facial challenge, the court required future 
briefing on these different issues and the standards of review that should 
be used,114 and denied “without prejudice the Rocky Mountain plaintiffs’ 
summary judgment motion related to its preemption claim.”115 
4.  The Ninth Circuit 2013 Reversal with Dissent 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 2013, reversed the federal district 
court opinion on the unconstitutionality of the California LCFS.116  The 
trial court decision was overturned as to the standard of review to apply 
to the regulation, whether the regulation was facially discriminatory and 
violated the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause, and whether the 
California action was impermissibly extra-territorial.117  With a dissenting 
judge, the 2-1 Circuit majority did not apply strict scrutiny to the California 
 
 111.  Supra note 92, at 1095. These federal objectives were asserted by the 
plaintiffs to include reducing the United States’ greenhouse emissions, enhancing energy 
independence and protecting pre-existing investment in renewable energy.  Plaintiffs 
argue that Congress struck a balance by not mandating pre-existing bio-refineries to reduce 
their lifecycle carbon emissions as outlined in the statute.  Id. at 1094–95. 
 112. Supra note 92, at 1095. A plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in 
fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; 
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that there injury will be redressed by 
a favorable decision.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 1099–1100.  The Court points to two specific affidavits that name specific 
plants that will be harmed by the LCFS and alleges injuries that have been suffered and 
therefore the Court finds the first prong satisfied.  Id.  Growth Energy had previously 
submitted evidence that satisfies this prong.  Id. at 1100. The Court addressed whether 
they would have associational standing, by plaintiffs demonstrating qualification under the 
three following prongs: “its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own 
right; the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and neither 
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members 
in the lawsuit.”  Id. at 1099. 
 114.  Id. at 1102–03. 
 115.  Id. at 1103. 
 116.  Rocky Mountain farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 117.  Id. 
FERREY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:40 AM 
[VOL. 5:  95, 2013–14]  Carbonite Legal Conflict in California 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 113 
regulation, and instructed on remand that a balancing test be applied 
pursuant to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).118 
The Rocky Mountain majority decision states that it is not 
unconstitutional for a state to impose a regulation whose effect is for only 
out-of-state commerce to disproportionately purchase additional credits 
and pay additional fees:  “California may regulate with reference to local 
harms, structuring its internal markets to set incentives for firms to 
produce less harmful products for sale in California.”119  Because goods 
are transported using fossil fuels, this discriminates, by its design, on the 
distance any goods travel in interstate commerce and imposes costs based 
on the point of origin of the commerce. However, there was a dissenting 
opinion—of four federal judges who have ruled on this specific case at 
the trial and appellate levels, two of the four found it unconstitutional.  
Including the separate legal challenge to the LCFS based on state law 
claims before a California superior court,120 discussed infra.,121 three of 
the five judges who have ruled on the LCFS program held it to be 
illegal.122 
The dissent in the Ninth Circuit decision found there is  facial 
discrimination.123 Any geographic discrimination by a state, whether 
along state or other geographic lines, is subject to strict scrutiny by the 
court, as cited in the dissent: “Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. 100 (“In 
making [the] geographic distinction, the [regulation] patently discriminates 
against interstate commerce.”).124  The burden is on California to 
demonstrate that no less burdensome regulatory incentives were available 
to control GHGs, and the dissent notes that at oral argument, California 
admitted that there were less burdensome alternatives on interstate 
commerce than “to use lifecycle analysis to reduce GHG emissions.”125 
 
 118.  Id. at 1078. 
 119.  Id. at 1090, 1104. 
 120.  Poet, LLC v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Ct. App., No. F064045 (June 3, 2013); see 
infra. 
 121.  See infra Section IV.A.3. 
 122.  This includes 2 of 4 federal judges, and the state court judge. 
 123.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107, 1108 (9th Cir. 
2013) (Murguia, J., dissenting) (relying on Supreme Court decision in Chem. Waste Mgmt, 
Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1994) (“additional fee [on imported commerce] facially 
discriminates.”)). 
 124.  Id. at 1108. 
 125.  Id. (quoting hearing transcript). 
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Where a state statute is drafted in a fashion which is facially neutral 
rather than expressly discriminatory, a court applies a strict scrutiny 
standard where the state law has a discriminatory effect .126  Justice 
Scalia, concurring in the majority prior opinion in West Lynn Creamery, 
noted that, “subsidies for in-state industry . . . would clearly be invalid 
under any formulation of the Court’s guiding principle” for “dormant” 
Commerce Clause cases.127  Fees imposed on out-of-state commerce have an 
identical effect to subsidies for in-state industry.  Strict scrutiny almost always 
results in the state action being found unconstitutional.128 Appeals continue 
in this already-reversed case. 
However, notwithstanding the reversal with dissent by the Ninth Circuit in 
California, there are relevant developments elsewhere in the federal 
circuit court of appeals on state energy regulation. Two other federal 
circuit courts rendered decisions in mid-2013, contemporaneously with 
the Ninth Circuit decision on the California LCFS, adjudicating state 
versus federal Constitutional authority to regulate aspects of sustainable 
energy: 
 In 2013, the 7th Circuit unanimously declared that it is a 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitutional 
for a state to treat renewable power originating out-of-state 
differently than renewable power originating in-state.129 
 In 2013, the 2nd Circuit unanimously affirmed the trial court 
that it is unconstitutional for a state to regulate low-carbon 
power in a way which affects the ability of energy commerce 
to freely flow interstate across state lines, noting that the 
matter was not yet ripe for review on the facts presented.130 
 
 126.  Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391 (“ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-state 
or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition.”); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple 
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992). 
 127.  West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 128.  See New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 279–80 (1988) 
(preference for in-state ethanol is discriminatory and environmental benefits are incidental 
and not a justification). 
 129.  Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013).  Judge 
Richard Posner, in an unanimous decision relied on a 2013 law review article on 
Constitutional energy jurisdiction issues authored by Professor Ferrey.  The Seventh 
Circuit declared unconstitutional state regulation limiting state renewable portfolio 
standards to in-state generation, as a violation of the Commerce Clause: “it trips over an 
insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce 
clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.” Id. 
 130. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 430, 433 (2nd Cir. 
2013). 
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These three contemporaneous 2013 federal circuit court decisions all 
hinge on the restrictions imposed by the Constitution’s dormant Commerce 
Clause and Supremacy Clause on  state regulation of energy, wherein the 
state must demonstrate use of the least discriminatory alternatives.  So 
there is disagreement between state and federal courts as to the legality of 
the California LCFS, between district and appellate federal court judges, 
within the federal court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and more 
generically between different federal circuit courts on the application of 
constitutional principles to state energy regulation which favors the state 
and burdens interstate commerce in energy.  Amid this disagreement, the 
California LCFS and A.B. 32 carbon regulation labor on. 
IV.  CALIFORNIA CARBON AND STATE LAW 
Several of the new legal challenges to California sustainable energy and 
carbon control policies are raised pursuant to state law.  We analyze these 
in two dimensions: 
 Where the state environmental agency is accused of not 
following state environmental laws; and 
 Where state agencies are accused of violating the 
administrative procedures which govern their operations. 
State law challenges should be more straightforward for state government 
to side-step than Constitutional challenges.  In any challenge, states enjoy 
particular deference in their exercise of jurisdiction—there is a presumption 
against implied preemption of state law131—and states receive deference 
in their interpretation of their own state statutes.  So despite base-line 
expectations of success for a state agency challenged for violation of state 
law with regard to carbon, California has not prevailed in the majority of 
 
 131.  See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, at 
168 (Wolters Kluwer/Aspen, 6th ed. 2013); Chevron v. NRDC, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984); 
U.S. v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); 
City of Arlington v. FCC, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (May 20, 2013) (“administrative 
agency is entitled to deference in its . . . scope of its own regulatory authority,” or 
“jurisdiction. ”); Ann Graham, Chevron Lite: How Much Deference Should Courts Give 
to State Agency Interpretation, 68 LA. L. REV. 1105 (2008); G. Vairo, Making Younger 
Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings – A 
Response to Professor Stavitz, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173 (1989); Antonio Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administration Interpretations of Law, 3 DUKE L. REV. 511 (1989). 
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significant legal challenges to date under state law to A.B. 32, the 
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.132 
A.  California Environmental Agency Environmental Violations 
When the California carbon regulation has been challenged for 
violating state environmental regulations, it is typical that the claims will 
simultaneously include alleged violation of state administrative procedure. 
1.  Scoping the Regulation 
This first case set back the entire implementation of A.B. 32 for 
approximately a year from its scheduled implementation to correct 
discretionary agency deficiencies.  California in, 2011, lost a suit against 
its carbon control cap-and-trade regulation, resulting in an additional year 
of delay in start of the entire regulatory program.133  The petitioners 
argued that CARB violated A.B. 32 by excluding whole sectors of the 
economy from GHG emission controls, adopting a cap-and-trade program 
without determining whether such potential reduction measures achieved 
the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions 
possible, failing to sufficiently evaluate the total costs and benefits to the 
environment, economy and public health before selecting the program 
Scoping Plan, and failing to consider all relevant information regarding 
GHG emissions reduction programs used throughout the world, as required, 
prior to recommending a cap-and-trade option.134  The petitioners claimed 
 
 132.  Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, A.B. 32, 2005-2006 Sess. (Cal.).  The 
California Assembly passed Assembly Bill 32, signed into law by Governor Schwarzenegger on 
September 27, 2006, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm. 
 133.  Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., CGC—09-509562 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
2011) (Tentative Statement of Decision: Order Granting in Part Petition for Writ of 
Mandate) available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/A132165.PDF.  Ass’n 
of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2012), Lisa Weinzimer & 
Geoffrey Craig, Delaying California CHG Cap-and-Trade Regime a Year Draws Support 
From Stakeholders, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 4, 2011, at 11–12. The court issued a writ 
of mandate enjoining CARB from any further cap-and-trade rulemaking until 2013. Ass’n 
of Irritated Residents, (Cal. Super. Ct. 2011) CGC–09–509562. 
 134.  Id.  Order Granting In Part Petition For Writ Of Mandate (9th Cir. January 
2011), rev’d on appeal unanimously.  The plaintiffs’ petition alleged specifically that the 
CARB scoping plan “(a) fails to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and cost-
effective reductions; (b) fails to require emissions reduction measures for significant 
sources of emissions, namely industrial and agricultural sources; (c) does not develop any 
policies to avoid the pitfalls of other greenhouse gas emission trading programs and fails 
to address how [C]ARB will monitor and enforce reductions in a regional market; (d) fails 
to assess the likely impacts of proposed policy choices and regulatory programs and fails 
to propose policies to ensure that compliance with chosen measures will not 
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that CARB violated the California Environmental Quality Act135 in the 
preparation of its Functional Equivalent Document.136 
As to basic administrative process, the court held that CARB did not 
abuse its discretion and was not arbitrary and capricious in making its 
program choices.137  However, the court did find that CARB improperly 
approved its Scoping Plan prior to completing the legally required 
environmental review.138  The court held that the scoping plan was selected 
by CARB prior to the public hearing on it, rather than after, and that the 
CEQA review was “approved” prior to the requirement to take public 
comment prior to a decision.  The court issued a writ of mandate enjoining 
CARB from any further cap-and-trade rulemaking until it complied with 
CEQA by analyzing alternatives to cap-and-trade and considered relevant 
public comments.139  This delayed the program implementation for 
approximately a year until 2013.140 
When re-promulgated a year later, in 2012, with a more robust 
consideration of alternatives, CARB’s Climate Change Scoping Plan and 
choice of the previous cap-and-trade option was upheld by a state court.141  
So, this successful state law challenge did not change the ultimate result, 
however it required the California state agency to reinitiate that choice, 
and thereby employing the correct process and consume another year 
delaying the program. 
2.  Large Project CEQA Applicability 
An environmental organization challenged a California statute that 
attempted to limit the scope of review of environmental approvals for 
 
disproportionately impact already overburdened communities; and (e) fails to prevent 
increases in criteria and toxic co-pollutant emissions.”  Id. 
 135.   The California environmental statute is somewhat similar to the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970). 
 136.  This alleged that CEQA was violated by “1) failing to adequately analyze the 
impacts of the measures described in the Scoping Plan, (2) failing to adequately analyze 
alternatives to the Scoping Plan; and (3) impermissibly approving and implementing the 
Scoping Plan prior to completing its environmental review.” Ass’n of Irritated Residents 
v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th at 7. 
 137.  Id. Tentative Statement of Decision: Order Granting In Part Petition For Writ 
of Mandate (9th Cir. January 2011) rev’d on appeal. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2012). 
 141.  Id. 
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carbon-neutral development projects which would spend at least $100 
million on construction in the state.142  The California statute would truncate 
review of a challenge to compliance with the California Environmental 
Quality Act.  A.B. 900143 allowed legal challenges filed pursuant to alleged 
failures under the California Environmental Quality Act to bypass trial 
court and go directly to a state court of appeal on a fast-track.  When A.B. 
900 was challenged, the court held that such limitations were 
unconstitutional given constitutional mandates allowing writs of mandamus 
to be brought in trial courts, by restricting the original jurisdiction of 
superior courts as conferred in the California constitution.144  The successful 
plaintiff environmental group subsequently requested that California 
reimburse its attorney fees for having pursued California to undue an 
unconstitutional action. 
3.  Liquid Fuels 
As discussed above,145 California’s low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) 
was “designed to reduce California’s dependence on petroleum” and “to 
stimulate the production and use of alternative, low-carbon fuels in 
California.”146  The LCFS regulates transportation fuels that are “sold, 
supplied, or offered for sale in California” and focuses  on the “carbon 
intensity” of fuels, a metric designed to assess “the amount of lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions, per unit of energy of fuel delivered, expressed 
in grams of carbon dioxide per megajoule.”147  California’s LCFS requires 
that fuel suppliers reduce the carbon intensity of gasoline and diesel fuel 
by 10 percent at the conclusion of the year 2020, from 2010 levels as its 
baseline.148  Ethanol is the only biofuel given an increased carbon rating 
based on land-use changes.149 
In a case distinct from a similar suit on the merits by other parties under 
Constitutional principles in federal court,150 the largest ethanol producer 
 
 142.  A new headquarters in Cupertino for Apple Corporation and a new 750-megawatt 
Solar Project in Riverside County had qualified for this limitation, prior to challenge. 
 143.  CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 17,785. 
 144.  Planning and Conservation League v. California, No. RG 12626904 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 29, 2013), available at http://apps.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb/service? 
Servicename=DomainWebService&PageName=Image&ID=2&Parent=20429158&Action= 
28915510. 
 145.  See supra Section III.B.1. 
 146.  Cal. Air Res. Bd., California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard: Final Statement of 
Reasons 457 (Dec. 2009). 
 147.  Id. at 5, 923. 
 148.  Id. at 461. 
 149.  See id. at 19, 21. 
 150.  See supra Section II. 
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in the United States challenged the LCFS rule in California state court, 
alleging a failure to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act 
and the state Administrative Procedure Act (APA).151  Plaintiff Poet, LLC 
challenged the LCFS regulations on the ground that CARB violated the 
APA by excluding certain emails sent by consultants not being included 
in the rulemaking file made available to the public.152 The trial court found 
against the challengers, but subsequently was reversed on appeal,153 holding 
that California had, in fact, violated CEQA and the California APA by 
approving the regulation before the required review under CEQA,154 and 
had improperly deferred formulating required mitigation measures.155 
However, after ruling against the state, the court refrained from enjoining 
the regulation under state law.156  The California appeals court denied the 
state’s request for rehearing.157  The parties were directed to submit 
comments about remedies for these violations.158 
B.  California Administrative Procedure Challenges 
There also are challenges which contest administrative aspects of the 
decision made by the state, without specifically implicating CEQA or 
other environmental laws. 
1.  Taxes or Fees 
Approximately 350 business with approximately 590 facilities are 
required to obtain and surrender to the state credits in the first phase of the 
carbon program.159  In the first A.B.32 compliance period, approximately 90% 
 
 151.  Poet, LLC v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 681, 707 (Aug. 8, 2013) (as 
modified on denial of rehearing). Poet argued that CARB failed to respond to numerous 
public comments, that it omitted documents from the rulemaking file, and that the LCFS 
will lead to increased GHG emissions, not the reductions it promises. Poet alleged that 
CARB’s LCFS rule exceeds the scope of authority delegated to it by the legislature. See 
id. at 708. 
 152.  Id. at 698. The emails spoke of the computer model that CARB used to calculate 
the indirect carbon emissions attributable to ethanol due to land-use changes caused by the 
increased demand for the crops used to produce ethanol. 
 153.  Id. at 709, 766. 
 154.  Id. at 726. 
 155.  Id. at 738–39. 
 156.  Id. at 767. 
 157.  Id. at 681. 
 158.  Id. at 681. 
 159.  Id. at 767. 
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of allowances are allocated free of charge to regulated entities.160  As a 
secondary source to procure allowances, there are CARB allowance 
auctions161 and secondary market trades.  In the California system, for 
auctions there are both floor prices162 and mechanisms to restrain too high 
allowance prices.163  The cost of California carbon credits advanced in 
auctions from an initial price of $10.09 in November 2012, to $13.62 in 
February 2013, to $14.00 in May 2013.164 
As the law was scheduled to become effective in 2012, California 
enacted four pieces of legislation to direct the flow of the anticipated 
substantial auction.165 The auction revenues were challenged by the 
 
 160.  CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, APPENDIX J: ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION 
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv4appj.pdf. 
 161.  Covered Entities may opt to trade allocated allowances by consigning allowances to 
CARB for sale through auction.  The first two auctions were held on November 14, 2012 
and February 19, 2013.  Auctions are open to Covered Entities, as well as a wide variety 
of other stakeholders, including opt-in Covered Entities (entities in a covered sector but 
which emit less than 25,000 MTCO2e) and so-called “voluntary associated entities,” such 
as brokers and derivatives clearing organizations.  almost 13 million 2013 vintage 
allowances which cleared at a price of $13.62, and 9.6 million 2016 vintage allowances, 
about half of which sold at $10.71 each. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CALIFORNIA AIR 
RESOURCES BOARD QUARTERLY AUCTION 2, available at http://www.arb. 
ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/february_2013/auction2_feb2013_summary_results_repor
t.pdf. The price of allowances is managed by a limited price-collar mechanism which 
includes an escalating auction reserve price and a price containment procedure. 
 162.  To control the floor price, CARB sets a reserve price for each auction below 
which no allowances may be sold. This reserve price was $10 in the first auction in 2012,  
then $10.71 in 2013, and will increase annually by five percent plus the rate of inflation.  
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, ADDITIONAL AUCTION 1 SUMMARY STATISTICS, and 
Auction 2 available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/november_2012/ 
auction1_summary_statistics_2012q4nov.pdf. 
 163.  To contain prices on the upper end, CARB is setting aside a pool of allowances 
which will be offered if prices exceed certain thresholds. Thus, of the total allowances 
available, CARB will reserve one percent of the allowances from budget years 2013-2014, 
four percent of the allowances from 2015-2017, and seven percent of the allowances 
from 2018-2020 for purposes of relieving rising prices should they occur.  CAL. CODE OF 
REGS. tit. 17, § 95870(a).  This reserve will total 121.8 million MTCO2e over the length 
of the program.  The price of reserve allowance will increase annually at five percent plus 
the cost of inflation.  CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 95913(e)(3). 
Allowances from future budget years are not placed in the reserve until the relevant year 
begins, however, all allowances currently in the reserve are available at each reserve sale.  
CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 95913(e).  A percentage of the reserve allowances are made 
available as allowance prices reach certain thresholds. For example, in 2013 the 
containment reserve will offer one third of the allowances in the reserve if allowance prices 
reach $40, with another third to be released if the cost increases to $45, and another third 
at $50.  CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 95913(e). 
 164.  Carolyn Whetzel, State’s Greenhouse Gas Allowances Sell for $14 per Ton in 
Third Auction, 44 E.R. 1556 (Issue No. 21, May 24, 2013). 
 165.  Poet LLC v. CARB, Petition, at 13.  S.B. 1018 requires that auction proceeds be 
deposited in a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund and authorizes auction funds to be lent to 
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California Chamber of Commerce.166  The complaint asserts that A.B. 32 
does not authorize CARB to impose fees other than those needed to cover the 
ordinary administrative costs of implementing a state emissions 
regulatory program.167 
This is distinct from a separate, subsequent 2013 suit brought by different 
plaintiffs challenged the California greenhouse gas allowance auctions 
under its emissions cap-and-trade program as an illegal, unconstitutional 
tax or fee.168  In the state law challenge, plaintiff Morning Star argues 
that the auction revenues cannot be characterized as valid regulatory fees 
because the revenues are not limited to the reasonable costs of any 
regulatory program, there is no relationship between the revenues generated 
and the benefits bidders receive, there is use of revenues for purposes 
unrelated to the regulatory program, and no CARB authority to generate 
 
the State General Fund. See Cal. Health & Saf. Code §§ 16428.9, 16428.9. A.B. 1463 
states that the Director of Finance may allocate or otherwise use an amount of at least $500 
million of the funds raised, while making commensurate reductions to General Fund 
expenditure authority, for the purpose of advancing the goals of A.B. 32. A.B.1463,      § 15.11 
Governor Brown subsequently requested such a loan of $500 million in 2013.  California 
S.B. 535 in 2012 was enacted to require at least 25% of the funds raised from auction of 
carbon credits to benefit disadvantaged communities, and a least 10% used for projects in 
communities that are identified as disadvantaged.  2012 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 505 (S.B. 
35); see CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 39713.  Utilities are required to auction their allocated 
allowances, obtain the auction revenues, and then rebate them to provide financial rate relief 
to their customers.  CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 95,892 (d)(3) (2012).  Auction proceeds 
and allowance value obtained by an electrical distribution utility shall be used exclusively for 
the benefit of retail ratepayers of each electrical distribution utility, consistent with the 
goals of AB 32, and may not be used for the benefit of entities or persons other than such 
ratepayers. 
 166.  Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Super. Ct., No. 34-2012- 
80001313.  The issuance and oversight of offsets has been performed by private parties, 
including the Climate Action Reserve. 
 167.  Id. at 9. 
 168.  Morning Star Packing Co. v. CARB, Cal. Super. Ct., No. 34-2013-80001464, 
Joint Ruling on Submitted Matters at 11. The suit asks the court to declare that “the auction and 
revenue generating provisions” of the cap-and-trade regulation are unconstitutional under 
Proposition 13, the ballot initiative that requires a two-thirds vote on taxes, or under 
Proposition 26, a ballot initiative requiring a super-majority vote on some fees and levies.  
A.B. 32 did not pass on a two-thirds vote, nor did S.B. 1018, A.B. 1532, S.B. 535, and A.B. 
1463, which stipulate how the auction revenues must be spent.  Plaintiff, Morning Star 
Packing, participated in CARB’s two prior auctions, spending $379,860 on allowances.  
Complaint. 
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billions of dollars of revenues for Califomia by selling emission allowances 
at auction.169 
The California Chamber of Commerce claimed that CARB itself is 
projected to raise a total of $70 million dollars, which is well in excess of 
that necessary to regulate the conduct of the entities paying the fees.170  It 
asserted that if the revenue raised from auctioning allowances under the 
cap-and-trade program is not a tax, but a “regulatory fee,” by law it must 
be relative in amount to the burden placed on the payer, and must be spent 
on programs that are related to the specific goal of the program reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, rather than for other fiscal purposes.171 
The state court initially allowed CARB to employ an auction mechanism 
for allowances under A.B. 32.172  This decision decided only that the scope 
of the legislative grant was broad enough to allow auction.173  In late 2013, 
the state trial court decided that the revenue raised by auction of allowances 
under A.B.32 was not an unauthorized new tax, although a close call.174  
That decision is now on appeal. 
2.  In-State Reduction or Global Application? 
Offsets are an alternative means to achieve compliance with cap-and-
trade carbon regulation, allowing lower-cost reduction opportunities outside 
the capped state to be pursued and monetized as tradable credits applied 
in California.  The quid pro quo for offsets has been the requirement for 
“additionality.175  A 2012 lawsuit in California by advocates for low-income 
 
 169.  Morning Star Packing Co. et al v. CARB Cal. Super.  Ct., No. 34-2013-
80001464, Joint Ruling on Submitted Matters (filed June 10, 2013), Petitioners and Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Issuance of Writ of 
Mandate, at 2–3. 
 170.  Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 167, at 11. 
 171.  Isaac v. City of Los Angeles, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). To 
constitute “regulatory fees” rather than taxes, fees must not exceed the reasonable cost of 
the services necessary for the activity for which the fees are charged and for carrying out 
the purpose of the regulation, and the fees may not be levied for unrelated purposes. Id. 
 172.  Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Super. Ct., No. 34-2012-
80001313. 
 173.  Carolyn Whetzel, Court  Upholds California’s  Authority to Auction  Greenhouse 
Gas  Allowances, Bloomberg Law State  Environment Daily, Aug. 29, 2013.  From the 
bench, the judge indicated that if it was decided that the California precedent of Sinclair 
Paint applied to the A.B. 32 carbon legislation, it would be an illegal tax.  Id. 
 174.  See Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Super. Ct., No. 
34-2012-80001313, Order November 2013; Morning Star Packing Co. v. CARB, Cal. 
Super. Ct., No. 34-2013-80001464 (Apr. 16, 2013). 
 175.  “Additionality” is the requirement in most carbon control statutes or regulations that 
only “additional” or non-business-as-usual carbon-reduction projects legally qualify to 
create carbon “offsets;” “which are tradable credits for compliance with these carbon 
policies.  See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MODEL RULE (Jan. 5, 2007) 
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interests attacked the California climate control legislation on the basis 
that its compliance requirements would be met principally by offsets from 
out-of-state or even international locations, without any assurance that the 
offsets would be “additional” to business-as-usual policies in 
California.176  Plaintiffs argued that the regulation was ultra vires to the 
administrative power of CARB, whose actions were arbitrary and 
capricious and not based on a solid administrative record.177  The 
California trial court in 2013 rejected both arguments,178 deferring to 
CARB’s expertise and experience and demurring to CARB’s choice of 
methodology.179 
Notwithstanding that states are expected to follow state law and if 
challenged in state court generally receive deference to their methods and 
choices from the court, California’s record is mixed.  The above five 
challenges under state law either resulted in the state losing the matter, are 
still in the trial court in some form or are still pending on appeal.  The legal 
carbonite has retarded the timing and clear path for this state carbon 
regulation. 
V.  GOING FORWARD 
This Article started by reference to the significant effect of carbonite in 
the Star Wars galaxy.  It is of note as we go to press, that Disney has 
purchased the rights to this virtual galaxy from Lucasfilm180 and is planning 
to increase the original 6 Star Wars movies produced by Lucasfilm to a total 
of nine, with the next release scheduled soon in 2015.181  Regardless of the 
prominence of carbonite freezing of galactic heros in the upcoming films, 
will legal fights over A.B. 32 regulation be settled before the next  Star 
Wars movies are released?  The litigation has not ebbed to date, with several 
 
[hereinafter RGGI MODEL RULE], available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_ 
corrected_1_5_07.pdf; U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34634, CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION: LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, at CRS-5, tbl. 1 (2008). 
 176.  Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth Foundation v. California 
A.R.B. No. Cal. Super. Ct. CGC-12-5195944, at 12 (2012), (Statement of Decision regarding 
Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  The court concluded that plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate that the legislature 
foreclosed the use of standardized additionality mechanisms or demonstrate that [CARB] 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in promulgating additionality standards.” Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  See Leonard, supra note 2, at 1. 
 181.  Id. 
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appeals pending and new challenges threatened.182  There are 17,000 separate 
characters that Lucasfilm has catalogued in the Star Wars empire,183 and the 
sheer volume of litigation over A.B. 32 and related California sustainable 
energy policy suggests that many of them now may have lawyers on 
retainer. 
One can feel a disturbance in the Force.  On  issues fundamental to the 
California carbon regulatory structure itself, we still await final appellate 
court decisions  on a  California program which at times seems to involve  an 
amount of resources  that could rival what Disney expended to buy the 
Star Wars franchise and Lucasfilm.184  One barrier  was removed  as a “close 
call” by a trial court in late 2013.185  Forward progress on A.B. 32 has 
been measurably slowed in legal carbonite.  Recalling that carbonite also 
refers to a brand which supplies encrypted high security,186 after four  
years of litigation, things do not seem yet secure. 
The recent Ninth Circuit reversal on the legality of A.B. 32 does not 
appear to have settled Constitutional questions.  The 7th Circuit  articulated a 
different posture on state discretion to regulate energy without violating the 
dormant Commerce Clause187 and certiorari has been requested of the 
Supreme Court on this.188  Of note, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2013 
interpreted the Constitution to bar a California port’s discretion to regulate 
the air impacts of fuel emissions.  However, even should the Rocky 
Mountain decision remain the final word on the legal viability of the current 
LCFS, it may not be the final act.  Four states—Alabama, Texas, Nebraska 
and North Dakota—indicated they eventually were planning to bring suit 
against California claiming that California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) sustainable energy incentive program as unduly burdening interstate 
commerce by not fully recognizing renewable power created by out-of-
state power generation units.189 
 
 182.  See Michael N. Mills, Will California’s 33% Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Survive a Commerce Clause Challenge by Other States? A recently filed Colorado Case 
May Provide the Answer 6 (May 2011), http://www.stoel.com/Files/TheOverride_Caseof 
theMonth_may2011.pdf. 
 183.  LEONARD, supra note 2, at 1. 
 184.  Id. (The price for acquisition was $4 billion). 
 185.  See Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Super. Ct., No. 34-
2012-80001313 (Nov. 13 2012); Morning Star Packing Co. v. CARB, Cal. Super. Ct., No. 
34-2013-80001464 (Apr. 16, 2013). 
 186.  CARBONITE, supra note 6. 
 187.  Illinois Commerce Commission, et al. v. Federal Regulatory Commission, 721 
F.3d 764 (7th Cir. June 7, 2013). 
 188.  Id., petition for cert. filed (Oct. 07, 2013). 
 189.  Michael N. Mills, Will California’s 33% Renewable Portfolio Standard Survive a 
Commerce Clause Challenge by Other States? A recently filed Colorado Case May Provide 
the Answer, at 6, available at http://www.stoel.com/Files/TheOverride_CaseoftheMonth 
_may2011.pdf. 
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California sustainable energy and carbon control policy has been a 
particular recent target of legal challenges.  This is, in part, due to California 
having one of the most assertive renewable energy190 and carbon control 
programs among the states.191  Challenged under the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause in 6 significant recent suits, California settled in favor of 
challengers or lost 5 of these 6; while the 6th matter was dismissed on 
procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the claim, leaving 
plaintiffs discretion to re-file the complaint.192 Challenging California’s 
low carbon fuel regulation pursuant to the dormant Commerce Clause was 
successful at the federal trial court level and was reversed by a split panel 
on appeal193  A feed-in tariff to promote sale of renewable power has 
separately been declared not legally permissible for California by a federal 
court and FERC.194  Prior FERC rulings on this exact issue held that any 
 
 190.  The California RPS of 33% renewable power by 2020 is one of the most assertive 
in the U.S. See id. 
 191.  A.B. 32.  California is one of only ten states in the U.S. regulating carbon 
emissions.  There are only two operating carbon control systems in the U.S., one in 
California, and one in the nine Eastern RGGI states.  The RGGI states only regulate CO2 
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including imported power.  California, by contrast, regulates 7 greenhouse gas chemicals 
(Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), 
perfluocarbons (PFCs), nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), as well as other fluorinated greenhouse 
gases), whether emitted by power generation facilities or other sources of emissions, 
including imported power.  California allows creation of carbon offsets from 4 sources 
(U.S. forest and urban forest project resources, livestock projects, ozone depleting 
substances projects, urban forest projects), while RGGi allows the creation of carbon 
offsets from 5 options (landfill methane capture and destruction, reduction in emissions of 
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) in the electric power sector, sequestration of carbon due to 
afforestation. reduction or avoidance of CO2 emissions from natural gas, oil, or propane 
end-use combustion due to end-use energy efficiency in the building sector, and avoided 
methane emissions from agricultural manure management operations).  When compared, 
California is much more assertive than the RGGi states (and all other states) in both the 
number of industries and the number of chemicals that it regulates.  See Center for Climate and 
Energy Solutions, California Cap and Trade, available at http://www.c2es.org/us-states-
regions/key-legislation/california-cap-trade. 
 192.  See supra Section II. 
 193.  See supra Section III. 
 194.  Independent Energy Producers Association v. California Public Utilities 
Commission, 36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994); S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (1995); In 
re California Public Utilities Commission, Southern California Edison Company, Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, F.E.R.C. Dockets Nos. 
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Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level, ELECTRICITY J. 52 
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such mandated wholesale power purchase “contracts will be considered 
to be void ab initio.”195 
The Ninth Circuit Rocky Mountain majority’s decision would stand 
somewhat apart from core holdings of Supreme Court interpretation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.196  According to this Ninth Circuit majority 
decision, a state environmental purpose to reduce GHGs emitted in the 
state is enough to impose regulation and costs on interstate commerce 
entering the state.197  Notwithstanding any articulated purpose, the Supreme 
Court has expressly held that state environmental purpose does not justify 
discrimination that otherwise infringes on interstate commerce.198 
How the states handle the legal carbonite inhibiting their regulation and 
incentives for renewable energy and carbon control is important, given the 
void of initiatives in recent federal regulation.199  California is a key state 
because of both the broad scope of its carbon regulation and the large size 
of its market share.  California and other states can avoid both 
Constitutional and state law legal challenges to their sustainable energy 
policies by using proven mechanisms. 200  However, few states have done 
 
(2006); Steven Ferrey, Carbon and the Constitution: State GHG Policies Confront Federal 
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 195.  Connecticut Light & Power Co., ¶ 61,012, 70 F.E.R.C. 61,029–30 (Jan. 11, 1995). 
 196.  See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (requirement to 
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Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 
353 (1992) (invalidating the provisions of Michigan’s Solid Waste Management Act 
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Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (invalidating 
Oregon’s increased per-ton surcharge on waste generated in other states); Chem. Waste 
Mgmt, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1994) (invalidating Alabama’s imposition of an additional 
disposal fee on hazardous waste generated outside the state but disposed of within 
Alabama); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (“ordinance 
is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the 
prohibition.”); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); 
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (invalidating equal fee imposed 
on in-state and out-of-state commerce, the distribution of which favored in-state 
commerce). 
 197.  Rocky Mountain farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 198.  See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 201; Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394. 
 199.  In the past decade, the only significant federal energy legislation, other than tax 
incentives, was the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 15,801, a relatively modest 
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 200.  See supra note 107. 
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so.201 The legal status of discretionary state carbon control techniques, 
measures, and regulations, is far from finally resolved.  Stay tuned for the 
next episode in this sequel. 
 
 201.  Id. 
